BLACKMAIL: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAWt
DOUGLAS H. GINSBURGtt
PAUL SHECHTMANttt
In fiction and in real life, blackmail is a particularly odious
crime. Despite the fear and loathing with which its practitioners are
regarded, however, blackmail remains an ill-defined and enigmatic
concept. The legal literature especially suffers from an inability to

define blackmail in a way that meaningfully distinguishes it from
threats of unquestioned legality made in the course of economic
bargaining. All agree that a key employee may lawfully threaten to
quit unless his wages are raised, and that if his threat comes at a
time when his employer is particularly vulnerable, he may have
engaged in sharp practices but not criminal conduct. Many threats,
such as those of a customer to take his custom elsewhere if a price
is not lowered, or to enter production for his own use if suppliers
are not more obliging, are actually relied upon in a competitive
exchange economy to discipline the market. But despite our
general ability to agree on the lawfulness of particular threats,
drafting a general law that separates blackmail from bargaining has
proved an elusive task.
Related to this problem of definition is an apparent paradox
embedded in the law of blackmail. Consider this paradigmatic
blackmail transaction: B has taken a photograph of A, a temperance
advocate, drinking whiskey; he approaches A with an offer to sell
him the photographic negative, threatening disclosure to the
newspapers if A fails to pay. Again, all would agree: B is guilty of
blackmail. The point to notice, however, is that B has threatened to
do only what he had an undoubted right to do, namely to facilitate
t This paper was written in 1979 when the authors were respectively professor
and student at the Harvard Law School. We did not publish the paper at that
time but presented it at a University of Chicago Law School workshop on law and
economics (which yielded many helpful comments, for which we are grateful) and
circulated it among interested scholars. Professor James Lindgren discussed the

paper at some length in his own publications. Accordingly, when Professor
Lindgren asked us to participate in this Symposium, we decided that rather than
revise the original paper we would publish it for the first time and add a postscript
in order to respond to his comments on the analysis.
tt Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit; Distinguished Professor of Law, George Mason University.
ttt Counsel to the District Attorney, New York County; Adjunct Professor of
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the publication of the photograph. Had B not approached A but
sent the photograph directly to the publishers, no liability would
have attached. The paradox, then, is that of a legal system that
gives B the right to reveal information, but prevents him from
seeking remuneration in exchange for his forbearance.
This paper applies an economic analysis to transactions in order
to define blackmail and to unravel the apparent paradox of an
inalienable right-whether it be to disclose compromising information or to do whatever else is threatened in a particular case. In the
process, we hope to show that the law of blackmail, as it has
developed in the United States and England, is consistent with
economic rationality. This is not to say that judges or draftsmen
have articulated an explicit economic rationale for the law; they
have not. Rather, our claim is that an economic planner, shaping
the laws to achieve economic efficiency, would include a law of
blackmail in his criminal code, and that his law would decide cases
in much the same way as have Anglo-American judges (and
commentators) groping to apply poorly drawn statutes to real (and
imaginary) facts. We shall first set out the state of the law in
general.
I.
At common law, robbery was defined as the "taking of money or
goods of any value from the person of another or in his presence
and against his will by violence or putting him in fear."1 Typically,
therefore, robbery involved the threat of immediate personal
violence, 2 delivered in person. As the criminal law is strictly
1 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *242.

Robbery was never defined

by statute, although the term appears in many statutes.
2 One exception to the requirement of a threat of immediate personal violence
was created in order to reach the "constructive robbery" accomplished by threatening to accuse another of an unnatural act. See Rex v. Hickman, 1 Leach 278
(1783) (holding that if a man obtains property from another by accusing him of an
unnatural crime, it will amount to robbery although the party was under no
apprehension of personal injury); Rex v. Jones, 1 Leach 139 (1776) (holding that
the crime of robbery is committed by obtaining money from a man by threatening
to charge him with sodomitical practices). As Russell explained, the "imputations
of being addicted to sodomotical practices would be sufficient to deprive the
injured person of all comforts and advantages of society, and would inflict a
punishment more terrible than death, both in apprehension and reality." 2
WILLIAM 0. RUSSELL, RUSSELL ON CRIME 973-74 (J.W. Cecil Turner ed., 11th ed.
1958). This form of the common law crime survives in England. See Rex v.
Pollock, [1966] 2 W.L.R. 1145 (Eng. Crim. App.).
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construed, one who could accomplish the same result-obtaining the
property of another by intimidation-but do so by mail-order could
avoid the sanction for robbery for want of an element of that crime,
i.e., a taking from the presence of another.
A. English Origins
The first entrepreneurs of crime to have exploited this inadequacy in the early law of property crimes appear to have been a band
or bands of Scottish marauders, poachers, and kidnappers who were
outlawed in Scotland 3 and then turned up committing outrages in
the northern counties of England. The first English statute against
them recounted a variety of mischiefs, including kidnapping for
ransom, pillage, and robbery, and made it a felony, punishable by
death without benefit of clergy, to pay or to receive "any money,
corn, cattle or other consideration, commonly called black-mail, for
the protecting or defending" of one's person or property. 4 Coming
over a century later, the better known Waltham Black Act of 1722'
suggests an origin for the particular term "blackmail," since it
recites that "several ill-designing and disorderly persons [had] of late
associated themselves under the name of Blacks" to commit various
armed offenses, "several of them with their faces blacked."' With
the Blacks' specific acts apparently in mind, the statute punished
anyone who should, inter alia, "knowingly send a letter, without any
name subscribed thereto, or signed with a fictitious name, demand7
ing money, venison, or other valuable thing."
The 1722 statute was broadened in 1754 by deleting the
requirement of a demand for money, etc., again in response to the
particular methods being used against victims, viz., letters "threatening their lives or burning their houses" but making no express
demand for money.8 It was extended yet again in 1757 to reach
3 See Scot. Act., Jam. 6, ch. 27 (1567) (Scot.) (outlawry); Scot. Act., Jam. 6, ch.
59, § 13 (1587) (Scot.) (a crime to receive or to pay "blak meill").
4 43 Eliz., ch. 13, § 2 (1601) (Eng.).
5 9 Geo., ch. 22 (1723) (Eng.). See generally E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND
HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT (1975).

6 9 Geo., ch. 22, § 1 (1722) (Eng.).

7 Id. G. WHITE, THE NATURAL HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF SELBORNE 20
(1833) refers to poaching by "the Waltham blacks" as "blacking." In another place
and time, depredations like those of the Blacks would be called "Ku Kluxing." See
Commonwealth v. Patrick, 105 S.W. 981, 982 (Ky. 1907).
8 27 Geo. 2, ch. 15 (1754) (Eng.).
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the use of anonymous letters threatening to accuse any person of an
infamous crime "with a view or intent to extort or gain money[]." 9
From 1757 until 1827 the crime of blackmail stood largely as
defined by these enactments: one could not lawfully threaten
another with death, arson, or accusation of an infamous crime, in
order to gain money.1° Notice that in this form the law posed
neither the definitional problem nor the apparent paradox noted at
the outset of this paper. The first two prohibited categories,
involving death and arson, dealt with threats to commit criminal
violence. As for the third, to accuse another of an infamous crime
would also be unlawful if done maliciously, i.e., without a reasonable
ground to believe the accusation true, while to refrain from making
the charge, if believed to be true, would be misprision of felony.
Thus the blackmailer trafficking in threats of criminal accusation
either threatened or offered to commit a crime, and the law rather
unremarkably treated him like the blackmailer menacing death or
arson. What one could not lawfully do, one could not lawfully
threaten to do in order to be paid for refraining.
The laws relative to larceny and related offenses were revised in
1827, and the provision concerning threats assumed the general
form it was to retain almost to the present era in England. The
1827 revision carried forward the provision against threatening to
accuse another of an infamous crime and expanded the scope of the
statute by making it a crime "knowingly [to] send or deliver any
letter or writing, demanding of any person, with menaces, and
without any reasonable or probable cause, any chattel, money or
valuable security.. .

."1

Under this phrasing for the first time it

was possible to issue a criminal threat to do a noncriminal, and
indeed even a nontortious, act; it was only necessary that the threat
be made "without reasonable or probable cause"-whatever that
12
would be held to mean.
9 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24, § 1 (1757) (Eng.); see also 52 Geo. 3, ch. 64 (1812) (Eng.)
("with [i]ntent to cheat or defraud").
10 There were minor amendments. Most notably, the penalty was reduced
from death to seven years' transportation or imprisonment, and it was made an
offense maliciously to threaten another with accusation of an infamous crime even
if done without using a letter. See 4 Geo. 4, ch. 54 (1823) (Eng.).
l" 7 & 8 Geo. 4, ch. 29, § 8 (1827) (Eng.); see also Larceny Act of 1916, 6 & 7
Geo. 5, ch. 50, § 2931 (Eng.); 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 96, § 3 (1843) (Eng.) (repealed by 5
Geo. 5, ch. 50, § 48) (making it a crime to "threaten to publish any libel" or to
"offer to prevent [publication] of any matter or thing touching any other person
with intent to extort," while specifically preserving unaffected the laws concerning
threatening letters).
12 W.H.D. Winder, The Development of Blackmail, 5 MOD. L. REv. 21, 36-41
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The problem of distinguishing permissible from impermissible
threats under this standard is illustrated by a trilogy of cases
involving the English Motor Trade Association. This organization
lawfully fixed the prices at which its members would sell automobiles and related equipment. It also published a so-called "Stop
List" of persons-members and nonmembers alike-selling at higher
or lower prices so that members of the Association would then
refuse to supply or otherwise deal with those listed. In a 1921 case
brought to enjoin publication of the list as an unlawful combination
to destroy the (nonmember) plaintiff's business, this activity had
instead been upheld as a lawful means to pursue a legitimate trade
13
interest.
In 1926, however, the inevitable happened when Percy Ingram
Denyer, the Stop List Superintendent, learned that Read's Garage,
Honiton had attempted to undercut the Association price. On
behalf of the Association, Mr. Denyer offered Mr. Read "an
alternative to inclusion in the stop list of payment of 2501 to the
Indemnity Fund of this Association." 14 Mr. Read did not pay the
money demanded but took the letter as soon as he received it to the
police, causing Denyer to be indicted under the blackmail statutes
and convicted by a jury.
On appeal, Denyer's counsel argued that "[a] menace implies an
improper motive," so that "[w]hen a person has a lawful right to do
an act for the protection of his own trade interest, he is not using
menaces if he demands money as an alternative to doing such an
act." 15 Lord Hewart, CJ., in response to this argument, wrote
with an equally broad sweep: "In the opinion of the Court, that
proposition is not merely untrue; it is precisely the reverse of the
truth. It is an excuse which might be offered by blackmailers to an
16
indefinite extent."
When the opinion in Denyer's Case issued, the firm of Hardie
and Lane, Ltd. brought a civil action to recover the 100L they paid
(1941) argues that the 1827 phrasing was not meant to extend the offense to
threats other than those to do violence. The first clear instance of its extension,
he reports, is Rex v. Tomlinson, [1895] 1 Q.B. 706 (Eng.). In that case, the
defendant had threatened to disclose the prosecutor's alleged indecent behavior to
his wife. It was said that the threat must be such as would operate to deprive a
reasonably firm man of his free will. See id. at 709-10.
13 See Ware & DeFreville v. Motor Trade Ass'n, [1921] 3 K.B. 40 (Eng. CA.).
14 The King v. Denyer, [1926] 2 K.B. 258, 260 (Eng. Crim. App.).
15 Id. at 262.
16 Id. at 268.
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toward a 200f levy imposed upon them by the same Association.
Although they obtained a judgment at trial, on the theory that the
defendants had conspired to obtain money by duress, occasioned by
threats, the Court of Appeal reversed, with two of the three judges
expressly doubting the reasoning of the prior case. 17 Scrutton,
L.J., put the case in general, referring to the Chief Justice's
statement in Denyer, quoted above:
I cannot understand this. The blackmailer is demanding money in
return for a promise to abstain from making public an accusation
of crime. The very agreement is illegal, even if the crime of a
certain class has been committed. A man has no right to suppress
his knowledge of a felony. How can this be analogous to proposing not to do a thing which you have a legal right to do, if money
is paid you, there being no public mischief in the agreement? 8
And he offered a specific illustration to reinforce the point:
A. has land facing a new house of B.'s. A. proposes to build on
that land a house which will spoil the view from or light to B.'s
house and depreciate the value of his property. B. implores A. not
to build. A. says: "I will not build if you pay me 10002., but I
shall build if you do not." B. pays the money and A. does not
build. Could it be seriously argued that B. could recover the
money back as obtained by threats? 19
In Lord Scrutton's view, then, there could be no instance in which
the law of threats and the substantive law concerning the thing
threatened would be out of step with each other: if it would be
lawful to carry out the threat, then it is lawful so to threaten, and
the converse.
In order to resolve this conflict among the lower courts, the
Motor Trade Association got up a "friendly action" against itself,
and the cooperating plaintiff appealed the case to the House of
Lords. 20 The Lords chose a middle ground, rejecting Scrutton's
broad view precisely because it did indeed protect the "ordinary
blackmailer [who] normally threatens to do what he has a perfect
right to do-namely, communicate some compromising conduct to
a person whose knowledge is likely to affect the person threat17 See Hardie & Lane, Ltd. v. Chilton, [1928] 2 K.B. 306, 320, 331 (Eng. C.A.).

Id. at 322.
19 Id. at 316.
20 See Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass'n, 1937 App. Cas. 797, 797 (appeal taken
from Eng. C.A.) [hereinafter Thorne's Case].
18
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ened."2 1 But Hewart, C.J., had erred in the other direction,
overstating the reach of the statute by omitting to inquire into the
reasonableness of the defendant; for
if a man may lawfully, in the furtherance of business interests, do
acts which will seriously injure another in his business he may also
lawfully, if he is still acting in furtherance of his business interests,
offer that other to accept a sum of money as an alternative to
doing the injurious acts. He must no doubt be acting not for the
mere purpose of putting money in his pocket, but for some
22
legitimate purpose other than the mere acquisition of money.
On this standard, the Motor Trade Association was adjudged not
guilty, but the analytic line between blackmail and protected
23
economic bargaining was left obscure.

B. American Developments
The American law of blackmail is almost entirely statutory, in
the sense that there are federal and state laws that specify unlawful
uses of threats and intimidation, 24 but there is a surprising paucity
21 Id. at 806 (Atkin, L.J.).
22 Id. at 807 (Atkin, L.J.); see also id. at 817-18 (Wright, L.J.) (stating that demand
must be made in promotion of trade interest and not with intent to injure, and be
reasonable in amount).
23 The Larceny Act of 1916 and other statutes relating to blackmail were repealed
and replaced by the Theft Act of 1968. See Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, ch. 50,
§ 2931 (Eng.); Theft Act, 1968, ch. 12 (Eng.). The Eighth Report of the Criminal Law
Revision Committee acknowledged that the prior laws had worked reasonably well in
practice, despite their facial anomalies "due rather to restraint and common sense of
prosecutors in limiting prosecutions to what [was] clearly recognizable as blackmail
... than to any merits in the sections themselves." CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMM.,
EIGHTH REPORT, 1966, CMND 2977, at 54.
The new English statute provides in part:
(1) A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or
another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with
menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the
belief(a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and
(b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing
the demand.
(2) The nature of the act or omission demanded is immaterial ....
Theft Act, 1968, ch. 12, § 21 (Eng.).
This statute is analyzed extensively in L.G. Tooher, Developments in the Law of
Blackmail in Englandand Australia, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 337 (1978).
24 See e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 271-79 (1988) (describing various offenses as "extortion
and threats"); NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 155.05(e) (McKinney 1988) (detailing the
elements of "extortion"); U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS,
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of reported judicial decisions interpreting them. There is no record
of an American court struggling to distinguish economic bargaining
from blackmail, for example, although the problem has not gone
entirely unnoticed.
In Vegelahn v. Guntner25 the court enjoined picketing by
striking employees on the ground that it constituted a "moral
intimidation" of those desiring to work. Justice Holmes, dissenting,
"pause[d] ... to remark" that threats were sometimes lawful,
depending upon the thing threatened. 26 "As a general rule," he
observed, "even if subject to some exceptions, what you may do in
a certain event you may threaten to do, that is, give warning of your
intention ... and thus allow the other person the chance of
avoiding the consequence." 27 Unfortunately, Holmes did not have
occasion to elaborate.
The broad view that one may lawfully threaten to take any lawful
action was expressly argued and rejected, however, in Keys v. United
States.28
The defendant there had written to the Aluminum
Association threatening to distribute a pamphlet to the effect that
the use of aluminum cooking utensils is harmful and causes diabetes
and other diseases. In the court's literal-minded view of the federal
statute under which the defendant had been indicted, neither the
truth of his claims, nor his right to disseminate them to the
public, 29 were relevant to his criminal responsibility for the threat
"to injure the property or reputation of the addressee."3 0 That is,

FINAL REPORT, A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 1741(k) (1971) (defining

"threat"); see also Alice K. Griep, Comment, A Study of Statutor) Blackmail and

Extortion in the Several States, 44 MICH. L. REv. 461 (1945) (reviewing various state
extortion or blackmail statutes).
25 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896).
26 Id. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
27
Id. (Holmes,J., dissenting). A distinguished panel of the Second Circuit was
less qualified in its per curiam statement, which was also, significantly, made in the
context of labor bargaining. See NLRB v. Karp Metal Prods. Co., 134 F.2d 954, 955
(2d Cir. 1943) ("There can be nothing unlawful in threatening to do that which it is
lawful to do."), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 728 (1944).
28 126 F.2d 181, 185 (8th Cir. 1942). The case was brought under the predecessor
of 18 U.S.C. § 875(d), which makes it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce
.with intent to extort [money, etc.]... any threat to injure the property or reputation
of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat
to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime." Id.
29 This right was squarely established in Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640,
644 (3d Cir. 1941).

30 Keys, 126 F.2d at 182.
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he may have been correct, and he could have publicized his views,
but he could not demand payment for his forbearance.
As these judicial fragments suggest, the distinction between
lawful and unlawful threats had not been clarified and articulated
in the American cases to any greater extent than in the English
cases when the drafters of the Model Penal Code turned to the
problem in the 1950s. Rather than synthesize the law, however,
they chose to follow "the prevailing legislative pattern in providing
a list of particular harms which must be threatened" in order to
commit a crime;3 1 the drafters explained that inclusion of all
threats "would embrace a large portion of accepted economic
bargaining,"3 2 but they offered no explanation for including any
threats to perform an act that would itself be lawful.
Thus, in lieu of analysis as to why certain threats are "accepted
economic bargaining," to which the application of theft penalties
would be "quite inappropriate," while others are worthy of criminal
treatment, the drafters offered only examples. The examples
constituting the crime are threats to:
(1) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other
criminal offense; or
(2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or
(3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business
repute; or
(4) take or withhold action as an official or cause an official
to take or withhold action; or
(5) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective unofficial action, if the property is not demanded or
received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the
actor purports to act; or
(6) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or
information with respect to another's legal claim or
defense; or
(7) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.3 3
31 MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954). Originally the
crime was to have been called "theft by intimidation." Id. § 206.3. This later became
"theft by extortion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
32 MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954).
33 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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It is made an affirmative defense to threats in categories (2) to (4)
that the property obtained was honestly claimed as restitution for
harm done (to which the threat relates), or as compensation for
4
property or services.
The first category of prohibited threats need not detain our
attention; threats to commit a tort or crime are threats to take acts
one clearly has no right to take, and they pose no anomaly.
Similarly, threats to accuse another of a crime, as in (2), take or
withhold official action, as in (4), or call a strike in order to profit
personally, as in (5), all involve an offer to default on a duty owed
to another, such as the state, or to an agent's (employer or union)
principal. And threats to testify or withhold testimony, as in (6),
should at least in a criminal case 35 be assimilated to threats to
accuse another of a crime; again a duty to the state is being offered
36
for exchange, which is for obvious reasons not a matter of right.
One of the enumerated categories, subsection (3), concerns threats
to communicate information, and thus comes within our area of
concern insofar as it would be lawful to make the threatened
communication. And clearly, it is quite often lawful to reveal a
contemptible secret or report a deadbeat to a credit bureau and
thereby impair or expose another to ridicule by his peers (or in the
case of a public figure, by the public).
We are also concerned with subsection (7)-"the general
principle on which other threats are to be included"3 7 within the
criminal prohibition-which, to our knowledge, is unique to the
Model Penal Code. The drafters gave three examples of criminal
threats to which this subsection would apply: (a) the foreman in a
manufacturing plant requires the workers to pay him a percentage
of their wages on pain of dismissal or other employment discrimina-

See id. (delineating the scope of the affirmative defenses).
-3 The drafters noted that a provision comparable to subsection 6 but limited to
testimony in criminal cases appeared in the proposed revision of the Wisconsin
criminal code, but they gave no explanation for preferring the unqualified language
34

of the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 2,

1954).

36 The case of an expert witness who will not testify unless paid is different
because he is under no duty to come forward with an opinion. See generally Marjorie
P. Lindblom, Comment, Compelling Experts to Testifj: A Proposal,44 U. CHI. L. REV.
851 (1977) (suggesting a rule for determining when an expert witness should be
compelled to testify). His "threat" to "withhold testimony or information"
presumably returns us to the realm of lawful economic bargaining although it comes
within the literal terms of the crime defined by the Model Penal Code.
37 MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954).
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tion; (b) a close friend of the purchasing agent of a great corporation obtains money from an important supplier by threatening to
influence the purchasing agent to divert his business elsewhere; (c)
a professor obtains property from a student by threatening to give
him a failing grade.38 It is most interesting that each of these
hypotheticals involves a threat to betray or cause another to betray
a duty of his office; indeed, in each example the duty is that owed
by employee to employer.
The drafters of the Code, then, offered a "general principle" the
only unique content of which is to bring certain threats by disloyal
servants within the ambit of the blackmail prohibition. Nor did they
give any analytic justification for the general principle; indeed, they
did not even maintain the reciprocal proposition, i.e., that threats
act, although
to take any lawful action would be lawful if the
39
actor."
the
benefit
"would...
harmful to another,
The point is not that subsection (7) is superfluous because the
drafters have anticipated in subsections (1) to (6) every threat that
it might cover; in a complex world, that proposition would be
doubtful on its face. Rather, we shall argue in Part II that the
subsection (7) principle of self-interest-as-justification, described by
the draftsmen as "the general principle" of blackmail, is rather a
close approximation to the rule that a rational economic planner
would prescribe for distinguishing socially useful from socially
wasteful threat activity. This analysis will explain the seeming
anomaly that it should ever be a crime to threaten to do a lawful
act, or put otherwise, to sell rather than to exercise a particular
option one has, on the ground that a rule allowing such threats
would encourage the waste of scarce resources.
II.
The economics of blackmail are best understood by first
analyzing the simplest of fact patterns. Consider the paradigmatic
blackmail transaction in which B threatens A with disclosure of
certain information unless A pays B for its suppression. Further,
38 Id. (footnote omitted).
39 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (emphasis added). Instead of an exclusionary
principle they offered only "[e]xamples of menaces which ought not to be included
...: to breach a contract, to persuade others to breach their contracts, to infringe
a patent or trade mark [sic], to change a will or persuade another to change a will,
to refuse to do business or cease doing business, to sue, to vote stock one way or

another." Id. cmt.

1860

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:1849

assume that we can view the transaction at its outset; B is contemplating the venture and has yet to unearth the damaging information. B calculates that, for $200 invested in research, he can
uncover information for the suppression of which A will pay him

$300.
If blackmail were not a crime, B presumably would proceed to
research, to threaten, and to collect. On the other hand, if
blackmail is a crime, B will be encouraged to seek alternative
employment for his time and money. And that is precisely the
point. Without a blackmail law, $200 of real resources would have
been invested in order to produce nil output. No rational economic
planner would tolerate the existence of an industry dedicated to
40
digging up dirt, at real resource cost, and then reburying it.
The analysis is not significantly altered by adding the reasonable
assumption that a newspaper is willing to pay B for the fruits of his
research-or investigative reporting, if you will. Assume that the
newspaper offers B $200 to uncover embarrassing information
about A. Let B do the research, at a real resource cost of say, $180,
but assume that he has a change of heart and decides that publication is improper. Can B then ask A for his $180 in costs in return
for suppression? Can he demand $200? $300?
An efficient legal rule would draw the line at $200, the price
offered by the newspaper and B's opportunity cost of selling to A
instead of publishing. This rule allows for the operation of an
independent economic incentive, so that B would undertake the
same investigative activities-those with an anticipated resource cost
less than $200-regardless of whether A would pay more than that
sum in order to suppress the output. It would not attract new
resources to "investigative journalism," whereas permitting sales to
A at prices in excess of $200 would do so. At such prices, B would
have an incentive to engage in research that would otherwise be
unprofitable, that is, to dig up dirt that would otherwise remain
buried, only to rebury it once paid.41
To this point, we have considered only blackmail cases involving
the suppression of information. That is the usual paradigm of
40 Keynes was fond of saying that in a depression it was not unwise to dig up dirt
only to rebury it, but he had in mind the use of labor with no opportunity cost.
41 The social cost of all this activity is not redeemed by the observation that B will
also produce an effect on the behavior of potential A's, since their avoidance of
conduct that, although lawful, they would not want advertised cannot be presumed
to be a gain. See infra text accompanying notes 70-77.
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blackmail, but the analytics of threats do not depend upon any of
the peculiarities of the market for information.
Therefore,
42
borrowing upon repeated judicial references to rights in land,
and upon a paper by Buchanan and Stubblebine, 43 let us now take
up the case of property owner B who plans to build a fence to
increase the privacy of his backyard. The solid line in the graph
below shows the marginal benefits (net of cost) that accrue to B
from additional fence height. They are shown as diminishing on the
reasonable assumption that successive fence height adds less and
less to privacy; 44 beyond height p there are no privacy gains but
costs are incurred, so that net benefits from additional height are
negative. Unfortunately, the fence will also block neighbor A's view
of a nearby mountain; A's marginal damage curve (the hatched line)
rises with the fence until the mountain is obscured at height z.

........ .......

Marginal harmto A

(loss of view)
Marginal benefit to B
t.

(gain of prvacy)

dr

Fence height

42
4
3

See e.g., supra text accompanying note 19.

SeeJames M. Buchanan & Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371,
377-80 (1962) (providing a theoretical treatment of externalities).
44 For simplicity, we ignore the fact that the first several feet of fence height
would not yield any privacy benefits.
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Under the familiar teaching of the Coase theorem, transaction
costs aside, it does not matter, so far as allocative efficiency is
45
concerned, whether B is liable to A for the damage A incurs.
Thus, assume that B has the legal right to "use his property as
he sees fit," that is, would not be liable to A for the loss of view. If
B were to build without internalizing the damage to A, the fence
would be height p. Under the standard analysis, A will bargain B
back to height x, where the social product (consisting of privacy and
views) is maximized. Both A and B will be better off with any
bargained division of EDP between them than if B were to have
built to point p.
What if B, however, anxious to realize even greater gains from
trade, threatens to build all the way to z, and thereby to block A's
view entirely? This would be the least efficient outcome, since both
A and B would incur net marginal costs-A in additional loss of view,
B in expenditure of additional fence-building resources. Just
because neither A nor B would benefit, however, this will not
normally occur; instead bargaining will again move A and B back
toward x, but now B may have captured still more of A's willingness
to pay. Moreover, as explained below, the threats to build to p and
to z have different efficiency implications, just as would carrying out
those threats.
Substantively the most desirable outcome would be for B to
build a fence of height x, and an omniscient lawgiver would locate
height x for any given set of neighbors A and B and so decree. In
the real world of less than omniscient lawgivers, however, x is an
unknown quantity, and it would be objectionably intrusive as well as
impractical, due to strategic behavior, enforcement problems, and
the like, to require A and B to collaborate in locating and reaching
x. As a practical matter the state must choose between (1) setting
no limit upon the height of B's fence, and (2) a policy limiting its
height to the point beyond which B cannot show, if A complains,
that additional height would yield additional value-gains in privacy
in our simple two-commodity model. These alternatives translate
into either (1) allowing B to build to height z, which is the furthest
he would go in any event since beyond height z there are not even
45 It matters, of course, in terms of the distribution of wealth as between A and
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potential gains from trade with A, or (2) limiting his fence to height
p, expressed abstractly in terms of marginal utility to B.
As between these two, limiting fence height to p is the superior
choice, since the threat to build to z only increases the possibility of
economic waste. First, the closer to x that B must locate his initial
bargaining position the better, since any increase in the distance
between the parties' initial positions presumably entails increased
bargaining costs. At the limit, if x were known, the lawgiver would
have been able to eliminate bargaining altogether by limiting B's
fence to height x. Second, it is possible that some As would not
place a high value on incremental units of view, so that the
intersection (x) of the demand curves for privacy and view would lie
to the right of p. In that event, bargaining need not take place, at
least once it is revealed that B's demand for privacy is such that
there is no room, given A's views about the scenery, for an improvement in their respective lots. On the other hand, if B had been able
to threaten A with a fence of height z, he might have extracted a
payment from A for his agreement not to exceed height p. The
bargaining costs and the costs of effecting this transfer payment
would have been unnecessary decrements from the potential social
product, and they could have been avoided by limiting B to height
p in the first place.
In addition, whether x lies to the left or the right of p, threats to
build to z raise the possibility that, solely in order to convince A of
the seriousness of his threat, B may have to put up the unwanted
footage only to take it down again later. Real resources are thus
expended to establish the credibility of B's threat, but in the end
there is nothing to show for the effort (other than the wealth
transfer from A to B).4 6 A rational economic planner (lawgiver)
would simply prohibit the threat at the outset.
Of course, it is also true that in order to convince A of the
seriousness of his preferences, B may have to build a fence to height
p only to reduce it later. This too represents a waste of resources,
and it is also occasioned by A's treating B's threat to build (to p) as
incredible. This waste may be less likely to occur, since A may be
able to make a better judgment about how much fence height will
really be useful to B than he can about B's willingness to incur costs
in the hope of netting a profit after A makes payment. More
46

A similar observation concerning "pollution entrepreneurs" who might threaten
to undertake production in order to be bribed to refrain appears in Donald C. Shoup,
Comment, TheoreticalEfficiency in PollutionControl,9 W. ECON.J. 310, 310-11 (1971).
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important, however, it is difficult to conjure up a rule of law, for the
elimination of this waste. Our rational (not omniscient) economic
planner, that is, does not have access to the appropriate graph for
each A and B. 47
Thus far we have implicitly disregarded the value of "spite" in
analyzing B's threat to build his fence to a height above p, as though
spite, or revenge, or what-have-you were not a good for which B
might have a demand, just as he does for privacy. If B does value
spite, however, then he might wish to build a spite fence higher
than p, perhaps as high as z, and there would be no reason in
economic theory to dishonor his preference for making A suffer.
In a world of free information, moreover, there would be no reason
to insist that B impose upon A in kind (fence height beyond p)
rather than in cash (by demanding payment for refraining from
building higher than p). In the real world of the legal process,
however, reliable information about B's mental state is costlyperhaps unavailable at any price-and since one would normally
expect the spite-motivated fence-builder to be willing, or even eager,
to incur the cost of extra fence height, it is reasonable to disregard
the slight possibility that any particular B, in threatening to build
the fence beyond p unless paid, is offering to refrain from taking a
step that would have served his demand for spite.48 Disregarding
this possible welfare loss in formulating a blackmail law would not
really qualify the rational economic planner's pursuit of greater
social product; it would merely take account of the fact that some
potential gains are not realizable because they are not as great as
the cost entailed in their identification.
47 Harold Demsetz makes much the same point: "Because it is difficult to sort
desirable from undesirable increases in herd or crop size [in our example fence size
or privacy], there is a real danger of penalizing desirable increases... by mistake if
such wealth transfers are treated as extortion." Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule
of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 25 (1972).
48 Similarly, Epstein notes:
The motive test (whatever its weakness) has an apparent dual advantage [in
spite fence cases]: it avoids the open-ended and explicit comparisons of
costs and benefits that are everywhere the bane of the legal system; and it
removes the need to make specific collective determinations about height,
shape, color, and the like, which are again difficult to generate through
common law decisions. Yet this approach requires a costly inquiry into
motive and tends to break down where both "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
desires lie behind a single act.
Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: CorrectiveJusticeand Its UtilitarianConstraints,8
J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 97 (1979).
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Recurring to the paradigmatic blackmail transaction with which
we began this section, it is easy to appreciate that B stands to gain
nothing from A by actually carrying through his threat to send
compromising information to the newspapers. Since the release of
information, unlike the construction of a fence, is irreversible, B's
only potential gain (again disregarding spite) is in establishing his
credibility as someone willing to incur a cost if not obliged. But
that is an asset only insofar as B is an entrepreneur of blackmail,
i.e., someone who expects to engage in similar future transactions
49
from which to realize a return on the investment in credibility.
Should B succeed in his efforts first to make himself credible and
then to acquire information that he can threaten to disclose, the
result will be an industry the output of which is nil, although
resources are consumed in its operation, viz. for informationgathering and threatening.
In short, therefore, a legal system designed to maximize
allocative efficiency would penalize not only (1) threats to do an act
that the threatener has no right to do, i.e., that would occasion
criminal or civil liability, but also (2) threats to do something that
the threatener does have a right to do but that would (a) consume
real resources, and (b) yield no product other than the enjoyment
of spite or of an enhanced reputation as a credible issuer of threats.
Reciprocally, it would not penalize the utterance of a threat to take
an action that is (1) lawful in itself, i.e., neither tortious nor
criminal, and (2) would confer some material benefit on the party
making the threat.
III.
The preceding analysis suggests a distinction among threats to
do a lawful thing depending upon whether they would give some
material benefit to the party making the threat. This distinction is
closely approached, but not quite reached, in some of the leading
cases and commentaries on blackmail, and in the "general principle"
of theft by extortion in the Model Penal Code.
In Thorne's Case, discussed previously, Lord Atkin focused on the
English statutory requirement that a demand, to be unlawful, be
made "without reasonable or probable cause." As reflected in a
49 See Daniel Ellsberg, The Theoy and Practice of Blackmail, in BARGAINING:
FoRMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION 343, 358 (Oran R. Young ed., 1975).
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passage quoted earlier, 50 he interpreted this to mean that a threat
made "for some legitimate purpose other than the mere acquisition
of money" would be lawful, having in mind, it seems, a distinction
between "the promotion of lawful business interests," and other
purposes. 5 1 But this distinction suffers from a circularity of
reasoning, the question being ultimately whether and why the
making of threats to do lawful acts should not itself be a "lawful
business interest." The answer we have suggested is that it would
be a business that consumes resources without producing a net
product.
Lord Wright's suggestion of a distinction between the promotion of trade interests and an intent to injure,52 although it may
seem to break the circle, is not adequate to the case because the two
motives may in fact coexist. 53 (On the graph, for example, B may
threaten to build beyond x to p, which serves his interest in privacy,
but, as he knows, damages A's view to an even greater extent. It is
of no moment to our analysis that B threatens to take his advantage,
which he may previously have foregone out of friendship, because
he now wishes to injure A.) Lord Wright was understandably at a
loss, therefore, to give meaning (apart from examples) to his further
proposed division between threatened acts one has a "legal right,"
54
as opposed to a "legal liberty," to carry out.
Lord Wright may well have been borrowing here from Professor
A.L. Goodhart, 55 who attempted to distinguish lawful from
unlawful threats to do a lawful act on the ground that the latter
involve "immoral liberties" which "in most cases ... are violations
of a moral, although not a legal, duty," and hence are merely
56
permitted rather than encouraged by the law.
So a man ... has a legal liberty, as Sir Herbert Stephen has
pointed out [in a letter to The Times (London) criticizing the
opinion of Scrutton, LJ., in Denyer's Case], to show a damaging
letter to a third person,....

50 See supra text accompanying note 22.
51 Thorne's Case, 1937 App. Cas. 797, 807-08 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
52

See id. at 817-18 (Lord Wright, concurring).

53 See Epstein, supra note 48, at 97.
54

See Thorne's Case, 1937 App. Cas. at 822-23 (Lord Wright, concurring).

55 Arthur L. Goodhart, Blackmail and Considerationin Contracts,44 LEGAL Q. REV.
436 (1928), reprinted in ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
COMMON LAW 175 (1931).
56 GOODHART, supra note 55, at 179.
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...
The case given by Sir Herbert Stephen is a case of an
immoral liberty .... 17

Its exercise is tolerated, but not its surrender as consideration for
a contract, so "there cannot be reasonable or probable cause for
58
demanding money for the surrender of such a liberty."
As should be apparent, Professor Goodhart attempted to explain
the peculiarity of the law of blackmail by reference first to contract
doctrine and ultimately to unexamined moral norms. But he shows
only that the law of blackmail carries moral force, as one would
expect the criminal law to do as a reflection of the community
whose values it enforces. He does raise, by implication, another
interesting question-why does the law not penalize the taking of
what he calls an "immoral liberty"-but he does nothing to explain
why, having decided to tolerate that, the law nonetheless sanctions
59
the threat to do so.
Professor A.H. Campbell, who correctly dismissed Goodhart's
approach as unhelpful, noticed that the various examples of lawful
threats appearing in the opinions in the several cases all involved
"abstaining from some profit or advantage which [the threatener]
might legitimately enjoy," whereas the common blackmailer
"surrenders no profit or advantage of his own in return for the
money he receives." 60 Professor Campbell accordingly suggested
that the courts identify unlawful threats by asking whether there was
reasonable and probable cause both for the demand made and for
the particular menaces used. He was thus troubled by the opinions
in Thorne's Case, because their emphasis upon the pursuit of a trade
interest as the touchstone of a lawful threat appeared to be too
permissive. It might, for example, allow the threat "of the powerful
man who announces his intention of starting operations in a field
in which he has hitherto shown no interest, unless those already
established in that field pay him to stay out." 61 His solution,
under the banner of determining whether the man had reasonable
and probable cause for making this demand, was to inquire into
whether he had a "present intention" of exercising his right to enter
the field and could do so "without considerable inconvenience. "62
57

Id. at 179-80.

Id. at 180.
59 See id. at 189; see also infra text following note 77.
60 A.H. Campbell, The Anomalies of Blackmail, 55 LEGAL Q. REV. 382, 388 (1939).
61 Id. at 390.
62 Id. For a related factual setting see Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363 (N.Y. 1888).
Plaintiff shareholder in a steamship company brought a derivative action to recover
58
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Although framed partly in terms of the threatener's mental state, it
can be seen that this two-fold inquiry could yield substantively the
same results as the test of material advantage suggested by our
economic analysis. 63 Indeed, it would if the inquiry into the
powerful man's intent were resolved solely by determining that it
would have profited him to have entered the market and therefore,
by inference, that he would have done so. If the "present intention"
he must show requires more, however, the results would differ
under our approach and Campbell's. Recast in terms of our
example involving the threat to build a fence higher than x, the
question whether the threat could be carried out "without considerable inconvenience" is analogous to the question whether B would
realize net marginal benefits; it would be answered in the affirmative up to p, but in the negative between p and z. The further
question whether B has a "present intention" to take a step that
does yield net marginal benefits would not be meaningful if it is
assumed that B is a rational utility-maximizer.
Finally, we return to the general principle of the Model Penal
Code, which makes it unlawful to threaten a lawful act if carrying
out the threat would not benefit the actor. Because the Code makes
self-interest the touchstone of legality, the principle accords well, in
general, with what we have argued a rational lawmaker would decree
in the service of allocative efficiency. Thus, so long-and only so
long-as our fence-builder B would realize net privacy gains from
additional height, under the Code he may lawfully threaten to
obtain them unless compensated for his forbearance.
But the general principle, without more, is imprecise and underinclusive in its condemnation. First, it is under-inclusive if it does
not reach the threat of our hypothetical investigative reporter B,

money paid to the defendant's company per an agreement not to compete, which, it
was alleged, was entered into after defendant threatened competition, and then
competed at a loss, for the purpose of extorting money. Since the plaintiff alleged
no fraud or collusion nor a clearly unlawful restraint of trade by the directors of his
company, but at most an error ofjudgment, he stated no derivative cause of action
to enjoin payments under the contract.
6s See Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 1892 App. Cas. 25, 27
(appeal taken from Eng. C.A.). Plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy to injure them by
excluding them from a shipping conference, and by engaging in predatory pricing
and secondary boycotting. Per Halsbury, L.C., "If such an injury, and the motive of
its infliction, is examined and tested, upon principle, and can truly be asserted to be
a malicious motive within the meaning of the law that prohibits malicious injury to
other people, all competition must be malicious and consequently unlawful... ." Id.
at 36-37 (Halsbury, L.C.).
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who offers to suppress information only if A will pay him a sum
($300) larger than he could get from his newspaper ($200). It
would be in B's self-interest, to the tune of $200, to carry out the
threat ("inflict [the] harm") if not obliged, but as we have shown, it
would be inefficient to allow this sort of threat in aid of a demand
exceeding the threatener's opportunity cost. Second, the general
principle does not seem to have anticipated the problem of the
threatened conduct that would "benefit the actor" by satisfying his
demand for spite (not to mention enhancing his reputation as a
credible threatener). Yet, it is difficult to imagine that the drafters
intended freely to recognize as a defense B's claim that he would
have benefitted in a nonmaterial way from carrying out the threat.
For the evidentiary reasons we adverted to before, this defense
would substantially undermine the general principle unless denied
or closely cabined, but the Model Penal Code offers no criterion for
rejecting it either generally or in a particular case.
IV.
Quite a different economic explanation for the prohibition of
blackmail has been offered by Professors Landes and Posner as part
of their more general theory of the conditions under which public
or private law enforcement are socially efficient. 64 According to
this view, "the decision to discourage blackmail follows directly from
the decision to rely on a public monopoly of law enforcement in
some areas of enforcement, notably criminal law." 65 Otherwise,
either over- or under-enforcement of the law might result, depending upon the blackmailer's pricing policies and the criminal's wealth
position. Blackmail is not prohibited only with respect to the
threatened revelation of criminal conduct, however; thus, Landes
and Posner go on to explain that blackmail is forbidden where the
information would humiliate but not incriminate the victim because:
The social decision not to regulate a particular activity is a
judgment that the expenditure of resources on trying to discover
and punish it would be socially wasted. That judgment is undermined if blackmailers are encouraged to expend substantial
resources on attempting to apprehend and punish people engaged
in the activity. 66
64

See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement ofLaw, 4

J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975).
65 Id. at 42.
66 Id. at 43.
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Insofar as the Landes-Posner analysis presupposes that the
blackmailer is threatening to subject his victim to public obloquy-by
exposing his violation of a norm that is widely subscribed but not
the subject of criminal sanctions-I see no reason to quarrel with
their point. It does not seem to be the case, however, that the
prohibition on blackmail is limited to the threatened revelation of
information that would generally, or even widely, be considered
disgraceful.6 7
Consider, for example, the case put by Professor Campbell in
which a lawful bookmaker, who cannot sue to enforce a gambling
debt, threatens to tell the client's "aged and pious parents who
consider betting sinful about their son's activities";68 the parents
will be mightily distressed by this intelligence, and their son will be
very embarrassed.69
The general point is that information may be humiliating, but
not incriminating, for any number of very particularized reasons.
These may be quite unrelated to any "social decisions" about the
economics of enforcement, and yet the prohibition upon blackmail
will apply; more than concern for optimal norm enforcement is
needed, therefore, to explain the law against blackmail.
The general principle of the Model Penal Code, by making selfinterest the touchstone of a lawful threat, responds to this diversity
of circumstances. Thus in the case of the bookmaker's threat to tell
the aged and pious parents of their son's gambling, one would ask
whether the bookmaker proceeded upon a reasonable belief that the
gambler's parents would pay the debts; if so, then the threat indeed
strikes one as lawful economic bargaining (at least as opposed to
blackmail), while if payment could not be expected from the
parents, the bookmaker would simply be threatening to "inflict [a]
67 Compare,e.g., 7 & 8 Geo. 4, ch. 29, § 8 (1827) (Eng.) with 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 96, § 3

(1843) (Eng.); compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(3) (making it a criminal offense
to threaten to "expose any secret tending to subject ...
any person to hatred,
contempt, or ridicule") with id. § 223.4(7) (making it a criminal offense to threaten
to "inflict any.., harm which would not benefit the actor").
" Campbell, supra note 60, at 395.
69 It should not be argued that the social decision to make gambling debts

unenforceable at law reflects ajudgment that gambling should not be encouraged.
No suchjudgment need attach to the activity; one can readily substitute for gambling
in Professor Campbell's hypothetical any other conduct-say, chewing tobacco-the
revelation of which would bring the blackmail victim into difficulties with the person
whom the blackmailer threatens to tell.
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harm which would not benefit the actor"-i.e., under the circumstances, blackmailing.
But is the bookmaker really threatening to inflict a harm at all,
as opposed to bestowing a benefit, upon the gambler's parents by
telling them of his activity? Professor Posner might question
whether the gambler's parents have truly been harmed when they
are informed of their son's activities; he might also question
whether the son has been harmed in any interest worthy of
protection when the false premise for his parents' good opinion of
him is corrected. For in Professor Posner's view, "the facts about
a person.., should be in the public domain so that those who have
to decide whether to initiate (or continue) social or business
relations with the person will be able to do so on full information."70 Were it not for the inefficiency of private enforcement
previously suggested by Landes and Posner, that is, blackmail should
probably be lawful; it deters behavior that would lead others to shun
the blackmail victim and, to the extent that both deterrence and ex
post blackmail threats fail, it may at least bring to light more
information upon which others can make decisions about their
dealings with the person.
There are two related assumptions implicit in Posner's reasoning. First, deterrence of conduct that would, if known, cause others
to shun a person is "efficient"; stated otherwise, behavior in
conformity with others' wishes is efficient. Second, additional
information about a person with whom one has social or business
relations always has a positive value; it is a good in that having a
marginal unit makes one better off.
These two assumptions would ordinarily seem unobjectionable,
but the (social) situations in which blackmail is a problem are not
ordinary, and the assumptions do not necessarily hold. An example
will illustrate the point.
Suppose that A desires to engage in an activity, such as chewing
tobacco in public, but that a B's report of his behavior to C would
cause her to lose respect for A's character; indeed, C might lose
affection for A as a result. If A is deterred for fear of a B, then A's
loss of the satisfaction of chewing tobacco is certainly less than his
gain from C's affection. But if he must choose between the two, it
is only because A does not have the exclusive right to this informa70 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 421 n.57 (1978);
see also id. at 399-400.
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tion about himself-B can appropriate the datum and repeat it to C.
Normally, however, A would not have to give up chewing tobacco
because the risk of a B telling C will be trivial: B would have no
incentive to expend time or money determining that C would be
interested and carrying the tale to her, since B will not be able to
sell the information to C. 71 If blackmail were lawful, however, B
could attempt to sell his silence to A, and A would therefore have
been, let us assume, deterred from chewing tobacco in public. A
will clearly be worse off than he would be in a world in which he
could chew tobacco in public without fear of C's learning it; but will
C be better off as a result of A's abstinence? Inasmuch as C desires

that A not chew tobacco and A does not do so, it might seem that
C is better off. But better off compared to what: a world in which
A does chew tobacco, or only a world in which A chews tobacco and
C knows it? Perhaps that depends on the basis for C's preference
that A abstains-that is, whether C is being self-interested or
altruistic. If C is concerned with A's welfare (e.g., tobacco stains A's
teeth) and not with her own (e.g., it will be unpleasant to kiss A),
then it is not at all clear that C is any better off when A conforms
his conduct to her desires, nor that C is any worse off when A fails
to do so. But it is certainly difficult to see how the welfare of an
altruistic C is affected by A's behavior when that behavior is
unknown to her.
Thus, the gambler's aged and pious (and altruistic) parents, who
considered gambling to be sinful, were made miserable not by their
son's gambling but by B's report of it. 72 It is not supportable to
say that they were made better off by reason of having the information; B's whole point in threatening to tell the gambler's parents was
that they would be distressed and the altruistic gambler would want
73
to avoid this.
In both the gambling and the tobacco chewing examples
instanced above it is crucial that the person to whom B threatened
71 The problem arises because B must sell his information without first revealing
what it is; C would find it impossible to evaluate undisclosed information, so that
agreement on price would be difficult at best.
72 Indeed, the report need not have been true to have had its effect.
73 Knowledge, that is, is not always a good-as the story of the Garden of Eden
tells us. Sometimes what we don't know can't hurt us, and sometimes it does.
Perhaps this accounts for our ambivalence on being offered a bit of gossip about a
friend. Surely it is what accounts for the coexistence of phrases such as "the awful
truth" and "ignorance is bliss" alongside their more abstract counterparts, such as
"the truth shall make you free." John 8:32 (New KingJames); cf.Ecciesiastes 1:18 (New
KingJames) ("[H]e who increases knowledge increases sorrow.").
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to communicate embarrassing information about the blackmail
victim was bound by ties of affection to that person. These
recipients of information therefore had an altruistic concern for the
victim that would not be replicated where the recipient and the
subject of the information had a trade rather than a social (or
familial) relationship. There, allowing blackmail might perform
useful deterrence and informing functions, as Professor Posner
suggested and as the reasoning and result in Thorne's Case74
suggest. To be sure, that would sometimes occur in social contexts
as well, 75 viz., where the recipient of information has primarily 76a
self-interested concern with the victim's reported behavior.
Where the recipient is altruistic, however, the deterrent effect of
blackmail would be inefficient. And it is almost surely against the
disruption of social rather than trade relationships that the
7
prohibition of blackmail is directed. 7
This paper has argued that the apparent paradox of blackmail,
that one may not threaten to do what one has a lawful right to do,
is an economically rational rule. If such threats were lawful, there
would be an incentive for people to expend resources to develop
embarrassing information about others in the hope of then selling
their silence. In that case, some people would be deterred from
engaging in embarrassing (but lawful) conduct, while some others
who were undeterred would find that their business or social
acquaintances or family were informed of their activity. Neither
such deterrence nor such information can be counted as a good in
many situations, however. These particularly include social and
family relations in which the concern of one individual for another
is altruistic rather than self-interested; i.e., where one might be
distressed to learn another's secret, but was not harmed by
74 1937 App. Cas. 797 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
75 And perhaps rarely in familial contexts.
76 Suppose, for example, that the gambler's parents would wish to know of their
son's gambling in order to revise their wills to prevent the son from impoverishing

the family.
77 It is not a mere curiosity that the leading cases in England (and the only
American cases) to grapple with the distinction between blackmail and lawful
economic bargaining have arisen from the business setting. See, e.g., The King v.

Denyer, [1926] 2 K.B. 258 (Eng. Crim. App.); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077,
1078 (Mass. 1896) (case involving labor dispute stating that "a combination to do
injurious acts expressly directed to another by way of intimidation or constraint...
is outside of allowable competition, and is unlawful"). Almost all other reported cases

involve threats to disrupt social or familial rather than business relations between the
victim and the potential recipient.
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ignorance of it. It is precisely these relationships that are threatened with disruption by the prototypical blackmail threat, and that
would be protected by an economically rational law. The general
principle of the Model Penal Code closely approximates this result
by prohibiting threats that it would not benefit the actor to carry
out.

78

An alternative economic explanation for the prohibition of
blackmail is that private enforcement of social norms would be
inefficient. While this paper does not take issue with the general
analysis of private enforcement, that analysis does not explain why
the blackmail prohibition extends to situations in which there is no
social norm (or very low enforcement costs) at stake, but there is
nonetheless a potential for embarrassment.
V. POSTSCRIPT 1993
ProfessorJames Lindgren has twice taken issue with the analysis
in this paper. In his 1984 article, 79 he says that our analysis
"assumes that a blackmailer decides to dig up dirt and sell it before
he knows if there is any dirt to dig up or what the dirt is," and that
therefore we are "unable to explain why it is blackmail to sell
information that is not purposely acquired."8 0 Thus, using
Hepworth's typology 81 he says that we can account for the prohibition of "commercial research blackmail" and "entrepreneurial
blackmail," but "cannot explain participant or opportunistic
blackmail, since these are based on information that would have
82
been acquired without any incentives for blackmail."
In a later article, 83 he levels the same criticism at Ronald
Coase's analysis of blackmail.8 4 Professor Coase acknowledged
Lindgren's criticism of our paper8 5 and responded: "While it is
true that in [a case where information was accidentally acquired] no
78 See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
79 SeeJames Lindgren, Unravelingthe Paradoxof Blackmail,84 CoLUM. L. REv. 670
(1984).
80 Id. at 695.
81 See MIKE HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL 74-77 (1975) (delineating four types of
blackmail).
82 Lindgren, supra note 79, at 695.
83 See James Lindgren, Blackmail: On Waste, Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA
L. REV. 597 (1989).
84 See id. at 600; see also Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture Blackmail,
74 VA. L. Rnv. 655 (1988).
85 See Coase, supra note 84, at 674 (citing Lindgren).
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resources were used to collect the information, resources would
certainly be employed in the blackmailing transaction."8 6 Lindgren's rejoinder is as follows:
Here Coase assumes that the "resources ... employed in the
blackmailing transaction" are wasted. But where no expenses have
been spent seeking damaging information, the blackmail bargain
proceeds much as any other. The blackmailer and her victim will
enter into the deal only if each expects a net gain-and a gain large
enough to offset the transaction costs of bargaining. Thus, the
mere expenditure of resources does not render the bargain
wasteful.
The unwarranted assumption that lies behind Coase's
argument is that, without the possibility of a bargain, the damaging information would not be released. But in our society
damaging information passes even without an incentive for
blackmail. ... One can imagine a world without gossip or
87
supermarket tabloids ... but it isn't ours.
Lindgren again concludes that the "Coase-Ginsburg argument
explains blackmail based on purposely acquired information but
does not explain blackmail based on inadvertently acquired
information."88
Lindgren overlooks a fundamental aspect of our analysis, for we
pointed out:
[In] the paradigmatic blackmail transaction ... B stands to gain
nothing from A by actually carrying through his threat to send
compromising information to the newspapers.... B's only
potential gain ... is in establishing his credibility as someone
willing to incur a cost if not obliged. But that is an asset only insofar
as B is an entrepreneur of blackmail, i.e., someone who expects to
engage in similar future transactions from which to realize a
89
return on the investment in credibility.
Although we focused attention on the resources that a potential B
would expend in order to "dig up dirt" about A, our essential point
was that by viewing the blackmail transaction ex ante, the waste
involved would be made apparent.
Thus, it is of no moment that a particular B may have come by
compromising information accidentally. Should A refuse to pay
8

6 Id.
87 Lindgren,
88
8 Id. at 607.

supra note 83, at 602 (footnote omitted).

9 See supra text accompanying note 49 (emphasis added).
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him, B has no reason to begin incurring expenses, such as are
necessary to secure publication of the information, except insofar
as he is looking to future opportunities for blackmail.
The
resources he expends in order to publish the information (and
presumably to get credit as the source of it) are justified only from
his ex ante perspective on the next blackmailing opportunityregardless of whether B sets out to find it or waits for it again to
come knocking at his door.g°
Thus, assuming that the first
blackmail opportunity arrives by accident, when B asks for payment
to suppress what he knows, he has become an entrepreneur of
blackmail; for B then to carry out his threat to reveal the information is an investment decision, not a part of the earlier accident.
In sum, Lindgren errs in concluding that "[t]he problem with
the Coase-Ginsburg approach is that it is unable to explain why it is
blackmail to sell information that is not purposely acquired." 91
On the contrary, the problem with the Lindgren-Hepworth
approach is that it looks only at the blackmailer's accidental
acquisition of information and ignores his intentional exploitation
of the information-in order either to get immediate92 payment or,
failing that, to invest in credibility for the next time.
9o "A man must make his opportunity as oft as find it." FRANCIS BACON, The

Advancement of Learning 1, 172 (bk. II, ch. xxiii, 3), in THE ADVANCEMENT OF
LEARNING AND NEW ATLANTIs (Arthur Johnston ed., Clarendon Press 1974) (1605).
91 Lindgren, supra note 83, at 601.
92 Professor James Boyle recently proffered a slight variation on Lindgren's
argument, noting that the prohibition of blackmail may lead "the accidental
blackmailer who would rather have been paid off than gossip, but rather gossip than
keep quiet, to spill the beans." James Boyle, A Theoy of Law and Infonation:
Copyrights, Spleens, Blackmai4 and InsiderTrading,80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1475 (1992).
That is, the would-be accidental blackmailer may derive value (e.g., status) from
gossiping, independent from his status as a blackmailer, and therefore if not paid may
be willing to incur the cost of disseminating the information. Boyle notes further that
because it is difficult if not impossible to determine the source of a blackmailer's
information, there is no way for the law practically to distinguish among the various
classes of blackmailers. He therefore posits that the economics of the blackmail
prohibition might be thought to rest upon "the proportion of accidental blackmail to
deliberate blackmail." Id.
By first approaching the victim with an offer, Boyle's would-be blackmailer, like
Lindgren's, becomes an entrepreneur even if he was not when he discovered the
information. Regardless of whether he then sells his silence or "spills the beans,"
therefore, the lesson of his experience is that the acquisition of damaging information
is a profitable enterprise. Cf Anthony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information,and
the Law of Contracts,7J. LEG. STUD. 1, 14 (1978) (distinguishing between information
acquired deliberately and that acquired accidentally but noting that "in reality every
adjustment.., in the benefits of possessing a particular kind of information will have
an incentive effect of some sort"). The prohibition of blackmail thus serves a
prophylactic purpose by discouraging even the accidental acquirer of damaging
information from acquiring an incentive to seek out information for use in a future
blackmail attempt.

